Author Archives: Paul Tsenesidis

Free-Standing Actual Innocence Claims and Guilty Pleas

In People v. Tiger, (Ct. App. 6/15/2018) (DiFiore, C.J.) (4-1-2), the Court of Appeals held that claims of actual innocence can not be brought under CPL 440.10(1)(h) after a defendant voluntarily pleads guilty.

This case involved a licensed practical nurse and caregiver who was charged with various crimes after she allegedly burned a disabled 10-year-old girl while bathing her. Following the incident, there was confusion as to whether the girl’s injuries were skin conditions caused by an allergic reaction to her medication or if they were in fact caused by scalding water. After plea negotiations, the defendant pleaded guilty to endangering the welfare of a vulnerable elderly person or an incompetent or physically disabled person in the first degree. During the plea colloquy, the defendant affirmed that “she was pleading guilty because she was, in fact, guilty.” Following the guilty plea, the family of the injured girl filed a civil lawsuit against Ms. Tiger. Based on the conflicting medical evidence as to the source of the girl’s injuries, the civil jury found that the nurse’s actions were not a substantial factor in causing the girl’s injuries but found instead that the injuries in question were caused by an allergic reaction to her medication.

At around the same time as the civil trial, the defendant moved to vacate the judgment under CPL 440.10(1)(h), relying on People v. Hamilton. CPL 440.10 (1) (h) allows a defendant to move to vacate where the judgment was obtained in violation of a defendant’s constitutional right. In Hamilton, the Second Department allowed for a free-standing actual innocence claim to be brought pursuant to 440.10(1)(h). The People opposed defendant’s motion, arguing Hamilton’s holding was limited to situations where a defendant was found guilty after trial, and therefore did not apply to guilty pleas which were voluntarily entered into by defendants. Continue reading

Does the “place of business” exception of possession of a firearm cover all employees?

Under Penal Law § 265.03, it is a Class C violent felony to possess an unlicensed firearm. However, New York’s Legislature crafted an exception for the possession of an unlicensed firearm in an individual’s home or “place of business;” if the exception applies, the offense becomes a misdemeanor. In People v. Wallace (Ct. App. 5/8/2018) (Feinman, J.) (6-1-0) the Court of Appeals held that lower courts should read the “place of business” exception narrowly. Accordingly, the court explained that this exception does not protect any employee who is caught with an unlicensed firearm while at work, rather it only protects those “who have a greater interest in protection of their premises, principal control over said premises, and a strong tie to the continued safety and security of their establishment and the goods and services they offer.”

This case stems from an incident where an assistant manager of a McDonalds in Buffalo shot himself in the leg after a gun in his pocket discharged. Upon arrest, the defendant was charged with CPW 2º.  Continue reading