In 1991, the Court of Appeals in People v. O’Rama articulated the proper procedure a court should go through when there is a note from the jury during the course of a trial: Upon receiving a jury note, a trial court should (1) mark the note as a court exhibit and read it into the record before the jury is called in (thereby ensuring adequate appellate review); (2) afford counsel an opportunity to suggest responses to the note; (3) inform counsel of the substance of the court’s proposed response (thereby giving counsel an opportunity to suggest appropriate modifications before the jury is returned to the courtroom); and (4) read the note aloud in open court before the jury so that any inaccuracies may be corrected by the individual jurors.
In People v. Morrison (Ct. App. 6/28/2018), the Court of Appeals, in an unsigned memorandum affirming the order of the Appellate Division, held that the trial court’s failure to provide counsel with meaningful notice of a substantive jury note was a mode of proceedings error that required reversal. This decision by the Court drew dissents from Chief Judge DiFiore as well as Judge Garcia.
The case stemmed from the rape of a 90-year-old Alzheimer’s patient in her nursing home. Continue reading
One other point worth mentioning about Robles is footnote 5, where the majority states, “We do not address whether Robles could have pursued relief by commencing a CPLR article 78 proceeding, ‘from which an appeal to this Court might ultimately have been taken’ (Newsday, 3 NY3d at 652).” That’s a very interesting issue. Would Article 78 be available to pursue relief? I suppose the respondent would be the JSC who denied the motion to quash, and the basis would be CPLR 7803(3) or (4).
But there’s a problem with that approach. CPLR 7801(2) states: “Except where otherwise provided by law, a proceeding under this article shall not be used to challenge a determination: … which was made in a civil action or criminal matter.” So that there is not an otherwise appeal process (CPLR 7801(1)) if of no moment if the decision is part of a civil or criminal action, which the Court in Robles says that it is. The key language, though, is the last clause of CPLR 7801(2): “unless it is an order summarily punishing a contempt committed in the presence of the court.” If the reporter is held in summary contempt for refusing to testify, then an Article 78 proceeding can be commenced.
The question then is the nature of such contempt proceedings. At least one authority takes the position that “[a]n order of contempt is not summarily granted and is not subject to review under Article 78 where it is made after due warning upon a record adequate for judicial review and with an opportunity for the contemnor to purge him- or herself of the contempt.” 6 N.Y. Jur. 2d Article 78 § 47 (citing Hunter v. Murray, 130 A.D.2d 836 [3d Dept. 1987] [“Accordingly, the court possessed the jurisdiction, power and discretion to hold petitioner in criminal contempt (Judiciary Law § 751), and since petitioner had available to him full judicial review of the record of proceedings finding him in contempt through normal avenues of appellate review, relief under CPLR article 78 is not available (see, Matter of Morgenthau v. Roberts, 65 N.Y.2d 749, 492 N.Y.S.2d 21, 481 N.E.2d 561; Matter of Legal Aid Society of Sullivan County v. Scheinman, 53 N.Y.2d 12, 439 N.Y.S.2d 882, 422 N.E.2d 542). Petitioner’s argument of the applicability of the provisions of CPLR 7801(2) is without merit, since the order of contempt herein was not “summarily” granted, but made after due warning upon a record adequate for appellate review and with an opportunity to purge himself of the contempt.”]).
I haven’t dug too deeply into this aspect of Article 78, but I suspect we will see this issue further developed the next time a report unsuccessfully moves to quash a subpoena. (LC)
An order resolving a nonparty’s motion to quash a subpoena issued prior to the commencement of a criminal action is final and appealable. However, in Matter of People v. Juarez (Robles) (Ct. App. 6/27/18) (per curiam) (4-3), a closely divided Court of Appeals held that no direct appellate review is authorized for an order resolving a nonparty’s motion to quash a subpoena issued after the commencement of a criminal action.
This case arose out of a criminal prosecution in which the People charged Conrado Juarez with one count of second-degree murder for the killing of “Baby Hope,” a four-year-old girl. In 1991, the victim’s partially decomposed body was found in a cooler near the Henry Hudson Parkway. She had been sexually assaulted and suffocated, but the semen investigators discovered was too degraded for analysis. For two decades, police could not identify the victim or the killer. In 2013, officers tracked down the victim’s mother, and from there, identified defendant as the probable killer. After his arrest, defendant Juarez gave a videotaped confession in which he admitted to strangling the victim during a sexual encounter.
After giving the videotaped confession and while in pre-trial detention, the defendant gave an interview to nonparty Frances Robles, an investigative reporter with the New York Times. The Times subsequently published a story based on this interview, in which the defendant offered an alternate account of the victim’s death that differed in some respects from the video-taped confession.
Before defendant’s Huntley hearing, the People obtained two subpoenas meant to compel Robles’ participation in the case: one for Robles’ own testimony and one for Robles’ written interview notes. Robles moved to quash both. Continue reading
While defendants may appeal certain rulings that took place during a trial, these issues must have been preserved properly for appeal. In People v. Bailey (Ct. App. 6/14/2018) (Rivera, J.) (6-1), the Court of Appeals held that in order to object to a trial court’s lack of inquiry following an outburst into a juror’s impartiality, the defendant must preserve the objection. Additionally, the Court found that testimony about gang customs and practices was not excessive.
This case stemmed from a trial in which defendant and two inmates were being prosecuted for assault of another inmate when they were all incarcerated at Manhattan Detention Complex. During the trial, defendant’s counsel sought to elicit statements that supported defendant’s theory that his assault was to protect himself after the complainant started a fight due to a codefendant using a racially derogatory term in his direction. On cross-examination, the defendant’s attorney asked if one of the codefendants provoked him and called him an “old n*****.” When complainant said he was not provoked and did not remember if that particular phrase was used, counsel persisted. Continue reading
Under New York law, a defendant who is represented by counsel on a criminal matter may, under certain circumstances, be questioned by law enforcement about a different, unrepresented crime without violating a defendant’s right to counsel. In People v. Henry (Ct. App. 6/12/2018) (Wilson, J.) (7-0), the Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, held that police did not violate Mr. Henry’s right to counsel when they interrogated him about a murder charge for which he was not represented by counsel. (Full disclosure: counsel for the appellant in this case is an adjunct professor at St. John’s Law in our advocacy program.)
The case stemmed from a robbery at a tattoo parlor and a shooting at a gas station of a 19-year-old man in which the same getaway vehicle, a black Hyundai Sonata with dark tinted windows, was used at the scene of the crimes. Five days later, Mr. Henry, driving a black Hyundai Sonata with dark tinted windows, was pulled over for traffic infractions and arrested for marijuana possession. Mr. Henry was assigned counsel on the marijuana charges. Upon an inventory search of Mr. Henry’s vehicle, police found evidence in his car linking him to the robbery of the tattoo parlor. Three days after his release, Mr. Henry was again pulled over for traffic infractions, but this time was arrested and brought in for interrogation in connection to the robbery and murder. Mr. Henry was read his Miranda rights, which he waived, and subsequently admitted to being the driver of the vehicle involved in the robbery and murder. A grand jury returned an indictment charging Mr. Henry with multiple counts of Robbery 1º, CPW 2º, Criminal Possession of Stolen Property 5º, Murder 2º, and Criminal Possession of Marijuana 5º. Continue reading