It is well established that trial courts have the responsibility of ensuring that a defendant who pleads guilty is doing so knowingly, voluntarily, and making an intelligent choice among alternative courses of action. However, this does not require courts, at the time of the defendant’s guilty plea, to ask defendants an established set of questions to ensure that the guilty plea is entered into knowingly and voluntarily. In People v. Cappiello (App. Term 2d Dept. 2018) the Appellate Term, Second Department, upheld the defendant’s guilty plea as having been entered into knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently and that the defendant understood the consequences of her plea.
During the defendant’s arraignment, the prosecutor made the court aware that there was a plea agreement in place in which the defendant would plead guilty to one count of Petit Larceny (Penal Law § 155.25) and would serve a 20 day sentence. In response, defense counsel stated that he had spoken with the defendant, and after advising her of her rights and the offer from the D.A., she had advised him to enter a plea of guilty with the understanding that she would only serve 20 days in jail. Defense counsel then waived a formal allocution.
This case drew a dissent from Judge Weston in which he voted to reverse the judgment of conviction, vacate the defendant’s guilty plea, and dismiss the accusatory instrument in the interest of justice. Quoting the arraignment transcript, Judge Weston took issue with the lack of dialogue between the court and the defendant when she was entering her guilty plea. Unlike other cases where a judge may ask the defendant a series of questions regarding the guilty plea, here, the defendant had no interaction with the court. As Judge Weston pointed out, the only proof that defendant waived her rights was her counsel’s general statement that he had “advis[ed] her of her rights,” which was not made in response to any court inquiry. This lack of on the record evidence calls into question whether or not the defendant truly knew the consequences of her guilty plea.
While Judge Weston understood the policy behind judges needing to keep arraignments moving quickly in the interest of judicial economy, he stated that a court still has the responsibility to ensure that a defendant enters a voluntary and knowing guilty plea. (MK/LC)
Barry Kamins has the first of two Law Journal articles about new legislation affecting New York’s criminal justice system. In the first (subscription required), he provides a thorough overview of the new Commission on Prosecutorial Conduct, including some of the constitutional controversies over the new commission. For those unfamiliar with the commission, the article is worth a read.
In People v. Larregui (4th Dept. 9/28/18), the Fourth Department did not review many of the claims that the defendant raised based upon the fact that they were not preserved for review. The one issue the court did review revolved around the fact that a witness testifying about an event about a month following the robbery at issue.
In this case, the defendant was convicted by a jury of Robbery in both the First and Second Degree, and Assault in the Second Degree. The case arose from an incident in which two women posing as prostitutes lured a victim into ambush by three masked men, who assaulted him, held a gun to his head and stole $200 cash.
The defendant in this case made several contentions that the court knocked down for lack of preservation: (1) that the evidence was legally insufficient to support a conviction because there was not corroborative evidence for the accomplice testimony; (2) the guilty verdict was repugnant because one of her accomplices was acquitted on all counts of the indictment; and (3) that prosecutorial misconduct deprived her of a fair trial inasmuch as she failed to object to any of the alleged improprieties.
The court noted that in order to preserve issues for review there must be objections “specifically directed at the alleged error.” Based upon the fact that there are so many issues that were dismissed on the basis that they were not preserved for review, it is clear that the Fourth Department values highly the notion of need to preserve issues for review. If an issue is not directly objected to, then it is not considered to be preserved for appellate purposes. None of the issues were reversed in the interest of justice.
One issue that the court directly addressed was that the defendant objected to the trial court’s allowance of an eyewitness to testify regarding an incident that took place a month following the alleged robbery. The eyewitness testified that the defendant came to the eyewitness’s home, tried to break down the door, and threatened the eyewitness with violence for talking to the police. While the court does note that the defendant preserved the issue for review, it nevertheless rejected the defendant’s contention because evidence of threats made by the defendant against one of the People’s eyewitnesses, despite being prior bad acts, is admissible on the issue of consciousness of guilt. The Fourth Department noted that this was not an abuse of discretion because the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect. (JC/LC)
Courts are back from their summer recesses, and so are we! Look for case summaries in several, new Appellate Division cases in the next few days.
When a jury asks clarifying questions of the court when deliberating, the court must meaningfully answer the question, without prejudicing the defendant. In People v. Wood (4th Dept. 7/25/2018), the Fourth Department held that a supplemental instruction provided by the court in response to a jury question constituted an abuse of discretion.
The defendant in this case was convicted by a jury verdict of two counts of CPW 2º and one count of Menacing 2º. (The first count of CPW 2º charged possession outside the home of a loaded firearm. The second count of the same crime charged possession with intent to use it against another.)
This case arose from a breakfast at a restaurant, which the defendant deemed cost too much and complained. Weeks later, he returned to the restaurant with a loaded gun, pointing it at employees and demanding sexual favors in exchange for the cost of breakfast. He was asked to leave and did so, and was then apprehended nearby by police. At trial, the defendant testified that the gun was a war antique of his grandfather’s and he was transporting it to another individual, keeping it on his person so that it was not stolen. The defendant claimed that he entered the restaurant to make amends with the complainant after his initial outburst. In his version of events, she insulted him, so he insulted her back and left, never displaying the weapon.
During juror deliberations, the jury sent a note requesting clarification on the terms “intent” and “unlawfully.” Continue reading