Is it a complaint or information?

Today, the Court of Appeals clarified the standard for determining whether a misdemeanor complaint has been converted into an information.  In People v. Kalin, the defendant pleaded guilty, at arraignment, to Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Seventh Degree.  The issue for the Court of Appeals was whether the criminal complaint was sufficiently detailed to constitute an "information."  This was important because the defendant, prior to pleading guilty, did not waive his right to be prosecuted by information.  CPL § 170.65(e) prohibits the entry of a guilty plea to a criminal complaint absent a waiver.  Thus, if the "complaint" was just a "complaint," his guilty plea was jurisdictionally defective, a claim that survives the guilty plea if the basis for the defect was that the accusatory instrument did not set forth a prima facie case.  Thus, the case boils down to the following: Was the accusatory instrument a "complaint" or "information"?

A review of the law in this area:

The usual instrument filed to obtain jurisdiction over an accused for a misdemeanor offense is a misdemeanor complaint (see CPL 100.05, 100.10 [4]). A complaint contains an accusatory portion that charges the designated offense (see
CPL 100.15 [2]) and a factual section that alleges "facts of an
evidentiary character supporting or tending to support the charges"
(CPL 100.15 [3]). The factual part of a complaint must establish
"reasonable cause" to believe that the defendant committed the charged
offense (see CPL 100.40 [4] [b]). … In addition to the reasonable cause requirement, an information
must also set forth "nonhearsay allegations which, if true, establish
every element of the offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof" (People v Henderson, 92 NY2d 677, 679 [1999]; see CPL 100.40 [1] [c]). This is referred to as the "prima facie case requirement" (People v Jones, 9 NY3d 259, 262 [2007]). 
… Standing alone, a conclusory statement that a substance seized from a
defendant was a particular type of controlled substance does not meet
the reasonable cause requirement (see People v Dumas, 68 NY2d
729, 731 [1986]). Rather, the factual allegations must establish the
basis of the arresting officer's belief that the substance seized was
an illegal drug — for example, an officer may allege that the accused
made a statement identifying the drug.

Here, the accusatory instrument stated that the officer's "experience as a police officer as well as [his] training in the
identification and packaging of controlled substances and marijuana" provided the foundation for his identification of the items as heroin and marijuana.

In Jahron S., the Court of Appeals held, in the context of a juvenile delinquency prosecution, that a lab report is not necessary to convert a complaint to an information.  On the other hand, mere reliance on experience and training was considered insufficient.  It was on this latter point that the Court of Appeals "revisited" the issue in Kalin.  Relying on the "core concerns" of the rule (giving the accused notice to prepare a defense and sufficient details to prevent a violation of double jeopardy), the Court held that the complaint in this case satisfied the requirements of an "information":

Defendant was on notice that: (1) he was charged with possessing heroin
and marijuana discovered in the car in which he was a back-seat
passenger at approximately 10:50 P.M. on January 21, 2006 at the corner
of Cypress and Myrtle Avenues in Queens; (2) the heroin was contained
in nine separate plastic bags in the center console of the vehicle; and
(3) the marijuana was found in a "plastic zip lock bag" inside the
glove compartment along with a "marijuana pipe containing a quantity of
marijuana." Based on these details, defendant could prepare a defense
(e.g., he could attempt to demonstrate an actual lack of knowledge that
the drugs were in the car to rebut the statutory presumption in Penal
Law
§ 220.25 [1]). These facts were also specific enough to allow
defendant to invoke the protection of double jeopardy in the event that
he was acquitted of these charges but later subject to further
prosecution. And, accepting the officer's statements as true, the
assertions were enough to inform defendant that the substances seized
were heroin and marijuana — the officer had been trained to identify
those drugs and their packaging, he had experience with narcotics as a
law enforcement officer and his observations of the substances, along
with the presence of drug paraphernalia, supplied the basis upon which
he drew the conclusion that he had discovered heroin and marijuana. … And, accepting the officer's statements as true, the assertions were
enough to inform defendant that the substances seized were heroin and
marijuana — the officer had been trained to identify those drugs and
their packaging, he had experience with narcotics as a law enforcement
officer and his observations of the substances, along with the presence
of drug paraphernalia, supplied the basis upon which he drew the
conclusion that he had discovered heroin and marijuana. … And, as detailed previously, the officer in this case presented more in
the accusatory instrument than merely stating that he used his
experience and training as the foundation in drawing the conclusion
that he had discovered illegal drugs. He asserted that he also relied
on the packaging of the substance that he determined to be heroin and
that the recovery of a marijuana pipe further supported his belief that
he had found marijuana.

The Court went on to hold that to the extent that Jahron S. requires more—such as a description of the item—"we are modifying that portion of the holding."  The majority opinion was written by Judge Graffeo.

In dissent, Judge Ciparick noted:

By holding that the charging instrument here is sufficient to allow a defendant to plead thereunder, and in effect overruling Jahron S.,
the majority brushes aside the protections that must be afforded to
misdemeanor defendants to ensure that such prosecutions do not become
routinized or treated as insignificant or unimportant. No undue burden
will fall upon the People if they are required to expand the
description of the drugs and packaging or provide specific information
as to an officer's training and experience. Nor will the trial courts
be unduly burdened by requiring that a defendant specifically waive
prosecution by information, thus avoiding the stricter jurisdictional
defect standard.

(LC)